AI-written summary of reporting by The Jerusalem Post. No human editor reviewed this. AI can misread or omit facts — read the original, linked below.
ABSTRACT

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was received at the Haftar family compound in Benghazi on Aug. 12, becoming the first Turkish diplomat of his rank to visit eastern Libya in more than a decade, according to reporting by The Media Line. The visit gave Ankara diplomatic access to both the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, where Fidan also met Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the eastern institutions controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.

Turkish foreign minister visits Benghazi, gaining access to both sides of divided Libya

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was received at the Haftar family compound in Benghazi on Aug. 12, becoming the first Turkish diplomat of his rank to visit eastern Libya in more than a decade, according to reporting by The Media Line. The visit gave Ankara diplomatic access to both the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, where Fidan also met Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the eastern institutions controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.

Context

Libya has remained divided since the collapse of Moammar Gadhafi's government in 2011. Dbeibah's internationally recognized Government of National Unity controls Tripoli and much of western Libya with Turkish military support, while Haftar's Libyan National Army and allied institutions dominate the east and much of the south. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia have backed Haftar. A 2020 ceasefire ended his forces' failed campaign to capture Tripoli but did not reunify the country's political, military or economic institutions.

Fidan's Benghazi meetings included Aguila Saleh, speaker of the eastern-based House of Representatives, and Belqasim Haftar, who runs the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund. After Benghazi, Fidan traveled to El Alamein on Egypt's Mediterranean coast for talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Ankara's intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin had previously traveled quietly to Benghazi in 2023, a move Rome's Institute of International Affairs described as the 'true novelty' that shifted Turkey from exclusive Tripoli partner to interlocutor with both halves of the country.

The visit coincided with a period of violence in western Libya. Two days before Fidan's Benghazi visit, Fawzi al-Mansouri, chief of military intelligence for Haftar's Libyan National Army, was killed by a car bomb in Benghazi. In the same week, six drone strikes hit facilities at the Zawiya oil complex, including one that destroyed a gasoline tank containing 4.5 million liters belonging to state fuel distributor Brega Petroleum. General Electric withdrew its engineers from an adjacent 1,300-megawatt power plant, more than 700 megawatts of which was already offline. A drone also hit the South Zawiya electrical substation on Aug. 12, and an overnight cascade of explosions blacked out Tripoli, Zawiya, Sabratha, Surman and Gharyan twice, according to Libya's General Electricity Company and Turkish state news agency Anadolu.

The violence occurred as Washington is pursuing what has been described as Massad Boulos' three-track framework — security integration, political cooperation and unified economic management — reportedly proposing reunification of Libya's rival governments in exchange for American oil investment and the release of frozen Libyan state assets, with elections deferred rather than made a precondition. Boulos, President Trump's senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, laid out the framework in Washington in April, projecting Libyan oil production of 1.6 million barrels a day in the short term and 2 million to 3 million by the end of the decade. Chevron won a Sirte Basin contract in February and Exxon Mobil followed with an agreement covering four offshore blocks. Before the US and Israel attacked Iran on Feb. 28, more than 20 million barrels a day transited the Strait of Hormuz; second-quarter 2026 flows averaged 4.9 million barrels a day as the war disrupted that traffic, making Libyan crude one of Washington's few near-term alternatives.

Under the reported arrangement, Saddam Haftar — described as being groomed as his father's political successor and already commanding eastern security forces — would head a new presidential council, while Dbeibah or his nephew Ibrahim would retain the premiership. National elections would be deferred to a later, unspecified stage. Pakistan has separately agreed to sell more than $4 billion in military equipment to Haftar's forces and has begun mediating between Libya's rival power centers with US and Saudi backing. Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia consult through the Regional Four, or R4, an emerging grouping formed to coordinate responses to regional crises.

The 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime delimitation agreement remains a source of regional tension. Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel reject the agreement as disregarding their maritime rights. The US, Greece, Cyprus and Israel established the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center at Rice University in Houston in June to promote energy development, infrastructure security and regional cooperation. Ankara's outreach to eastern Libya could, according to analysis cited in the article, make opposition there to the 2019 agreement less certain.

All Perspectives
Hakan Fidan, Turkish Foreign Minister: Fidan told reporters that 'Turkey does not consider Libya's peace and stability separately from its own stability.' In Cairo, he said that if Israel did not advance to the second phase of the Gaza agreement, 'there will be radical steps that we, Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, must take.'
Kaan Devecioğlu, Ankara-based Center for Middle Eastern Studies: Devecioğlu wrote that Fidan's shuttle should be read 'not as Turkey abandoning its former Libya policy, but as transforming the strategic gains established around Tripoli in 2019 into a broader architecture of influence extending across Libya,' and that normalization with Egypt was 'one of the most important regional changes making the Turkey-Haftar rapprochement possible.'
Hany El-Aasar, Cairo-based National Center for Studies: El-Aasar told The Media Line that 'Egyptian-American agreement on the Libyan file is a strategic necessity for both sides,' and said Libya's security and energy institutions had come under pressure at the moment Washington was trying to bind them together. He also cautioned: 'We cannot deal with the drone strikes and the assassination as separate incidents, nor can we jump to the conclusion that a single plot lies behind them.'
Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yanarocak described the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime agreement as a border 'that lacks geographic logic but serves Ankara as a strategic tool to control shipping routes and infrastructure on which the economies and security of Israel and the entire region depend,' warning that any Turkish assertion of authority 'could turn into harassment of Israeli ships.'
Reichman University-affiliated International Institute for Counter-Terrorism: The institute described Turkey's Libya-to-Horn-of-Africa footprint as a 'crawling encirclement' that 'quietly completes a move that threatens not only Israel's security but also the arteries of its economy.'
Takvim (Turkish pro-government daily): The daily described Fidan's tour as a 'diplomatic landing' in Libya and headlined that the Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan defense pact signed in Mecca on Aug. 7 had triggered 'panic in Athens and Tel Aviv.'
Israel's Foreign Ministry: Responding on X/Twitter to the appearance of a map showing 'Palestine from the River to the Sea' on a wall behind Fidan and Dbeibah during their Tripoli meeting, Israel's Foreign Ministry said Fidan 'can save himself the trouble of giving lectures and issuing threats,' and accused Turkey of being 'a headquarters for Hamas movement, hosting its leaders.'
Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt: Ben Aharon told The Media Line he would 'be cautious about describing the visit as a strategic breakthrough,' calling it 'certainly a notable diplomatic achievement for Ankara, but from an Israeli perspective it does not fundamentally alter the regional balance. Libya neither borders Israel nor poses a direct security challenge in the way that Turkish involvement in Syria or Gaza does.' He said the shuttle should be understood less as a policy reversal than as Ankara adapting its diplomacy to a changed regional environment, and that Egypt, Turkey and the US 'all currently have incentives to preserve a minimum degree of coordination in Libya because stability has become a higher-order strategic objective.' He added that if Turkey consolidates ties with both Libyan authorities while preserving the 2019 maritime memorandum, 'Israeli policymakers will increasingly have to factor Ankara's Libya policy into their long-term energy and maritime planning.'
Libyan security source (unnamed): A Libyan security source with detailed knowledge of the western Libyan militia network told The Media Line that the drones used in the Zawiya attacks were stolen from the warehouses of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, the Tripoli militia commander killed in the May 12, 2025, clashes, and that control of the inventory eventually passed to a cousin of a figure known as 'Amo Mohammed al-Dabbashi,' who was himself killed months after the theft.
Petroleum Facilities Guard: The guard said its initial forensic investigation points to first-person-view drones launched from inside Libya, some of which were controlled through fiber-optic cables rather than radio signals, making them highly resistant to conventional electronic jamming.
National Oil Corporation: The corporation warned that it may declare force majeure, allowing it to suspend contractual obligations, if the drone attacks continue.
Omar Khattaly, Libyan-American analyst and business consultant: Khattaly, who advises on Libya's political economy and visited Tripoli in late July, said that 'for many in Libya, Boulos' proposal lacks popular support because of its vagueness and lack of a clear vision for taking Libya toward stability and safety.'
Position not represented in the source reporting: Khalifa Haftar and Libyan National Army leadership (no direct statement or response from either is quoted in the source); Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (present at Fidan's Tripoli meeting but not quoted); Massad Boulos, US senior adviser (described as author of the reported framework but not directly quoted).
Gaps & Unknowns
  • The source does not state whether Khalifa Haftar or Saddam Haftar personally met with Fidan during the Benghazi visit, or which members of the Haftar family were present.
  • The source does not state whether the Haftar-aligned eastern government issued any public statement about Fidan's visit or its outcome.
  • The source does not state whether the United Arab Emirates, which backed Haftar for a decade, has commented on Fidan's Benghazi visit specifically.
  • The source does not state whether any party has claimed responsibility for the Zawiya drone strikes or the assassination of Fawzi al-Mansouri.
  • The source does not state whether Massad Boulos or other US officials have formally responded to Fidan's shuttle or the concurrent violence in Libya.
  • The source does not establish whether the reported Boulos three-track framework has been publicly confirmed by the US government or remains based solely on reporting.
Sources & Further Reading
  1. The Jerusalem Post — original

Read the original at The Jerusalem Post

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