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ABSTRACT

The author of an analysis of antisemitic violence since October 7 argues that Western governments have identified a multinational campaign by Iran and Iranian-backed organizations against Jewish and Israeli targets, and that Tehran increasingly outsources attacks to criminals and other intermediaries to make its responsibility harder to detect. Twenty-four governments, including the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany and Sweden, jointly condemned in June what they described as "lethal plotting and other malign actions" by Iran's IRGC Intelligence Organization, Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence.

Governments say Iran directed plots on Jewish targets in Europe, North America, Australia

Governments say Iran directed plots on Jewish targets in Europe, North America, Australia

The author of an analysis of antisemitic violence since October 7 argues that Western governments have identified a multinational campaign by Iran and Iranian-backed organizations against Jewish and Israeli targets, and that Tehran increasingly outsources attacks to criminals and other intermediaries to make its responsibility harder to detect. Twenty-four governments, including the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany and Sweden, jointly condemned in June what they described as "lethal plotting and other malign actions" by Iran's IRGC Intelligence Organization, Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence.

Context

The 24 governments identified "Jewish and Israeli communities and interests" among Iran's targets and noted the Iranian security services' longstanding relationship with international and local criminal groups, according to the analysis. The author states that Iran increasingly appears to be outsourcing attacks to criminals and other intermediaries.

Sweden, the analysis states, provides an early example. In January 2024 a live grenade was found at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. In May 2024 Sweden's security service announced that Iran was using Swedish criminal networks to commit violent acts, including against Jewish and Israeli targets. The United States subsequently sanctioned the Foxtrot criminal network for allegedly carrying out the embassy attack on Iran's behalf. The analysis states that Sweden expelled an Iranian diplomat and summoned Iran's ambassador over evidence of Iranian efforts to threaten Jewish and Israeli interests, as well as Iranian dissidents, in Sweden.

In Australia, a kosher restaurant in Sydney, Lewis' Continental Kitchen, was set on fire in October 2024, and Melbourne's Adass Israel Synagogue was firebombed two months later, according to the analysis. Australia's domestic intelligence agency, ASIO, concluded after an extensive investigation that the Iranian government had directed both attacks and likely additional attacks as well. Australia expelled Iran's ambassador and designated the IRGC a state sponsor of terrorism. Australian authorities said Iran deliberately used intermediaries to conceal its involvement, and that the objective was not only to damage Jewish institutions but also to frighten Australian Jews and exacerbate divisions within Australian society.

In the United States, federal prosecutors alleged in 2024 that an IRGC asset, Farhad Shakeri, had been instructed to surveil two Jewish Americans in New York, with $500,000 offered for the murder of either, the analysis states. In a later case it describes, prosecutors allege that Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, an Iraqi national associated with the Iranian-backed Kata'ib Hezbollah and the IRGC, supplied an undercover operative with photographs and locations of a prominent New York synagogue and Jewish institutions in Los Angeles and Scottsdale, Arizona, and allegedly discussed whether the New York synagogue should be bombed or set on fire. The analysis states the attacks were never carried out.

German authorities uncovered alleged Iranian surveillance of the German-Israeli Society and the office of Josef Schuster, president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, and another suspect allegedly sought weapons for attacks on Jewish targets, according to the analysis. British authorities uncovered hostile surveillance of targets including the Israeli Embassy, Bevis Marks Synagogue, the JW3 Jewish community center and the Community Security Trust. In 2026, the analysis states, Britain experienced a succession of attacks claimed by an organization it describes as obscure, Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (HAYI), or the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right, with targets including four Jewish-community Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green, synagogues and other Jewish institutions; in April, two Jewish men were seriously wounded in a stabbing. Britain sanctioned HAYI as an Iran-linked organization, noting that it had claimed responsibility for seven attacks against British locations associated with Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media.

The analysis states HAYI's activities extended beyond Britain, with the group claiming attacks against Jewish targets elsewhere in Europe, while U.S. prosecutors allege Al-Saadi participated in HAYI activities on behalf of Kata'ib Hezbollah and the IRGC. Among the incidents described by the Justice Department was the April 2026 burning of a synagogue in Skopje, North Macedonia; prosecutors say Al-Saadi subsequently distributed HAYI video of the burning.

Canada, the analysis states, presents a murkier picture: Canadian intelligence has warned that Iran uses organized-crime proxies and has disrupted Iranian plots, and a Canadian intelligence assessment reported by Global News reportedly concluded that Iranian intelligence may be using Canadian criminal organizations to target Jews. U.S. authorities also allege that Al-Saadi's network planned attacks in Canada.

The author states that amid a broader increase in antisemitic violence since October 7, Western authorities have identified something more specific: a multinational Iranian and Iranian-proxy campaign targeting Jews and Jewish institutions, often using local criminals and other intermediaries to obscure responsibility. The author argues the target countries' response has been relatively restrained, describing "an expelled diplomat here, a sanctioned entity there," and asks whether the Iranian government's attempt to murder these countries' citizens should demand a stronger response.

Gaps & Unknowns
  • The source does not state the date on which Sweden expelled the Iranian diplomat or summoned Iran's ambassador, describing the actions only as having occurred in the week of the report.
  • The source does not state the outcome or current procedural status of the U.S. cases involving Farhad Shakeri or Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, including whether either was arrested or tried.
  • The source does not state how many plots or attacks in total have been attributed to Iran or its proxies, or how many were disrupted.
  • The source does not state what evidence Sweden cited for expelling the Iranian diplomat or summoning Iran's ambassador.
  • The source does not state what HAYI is beyond a description of it as obscure and Iran-linked, or where it is based.
  • The source does not state whether the countries named coordinated their responses to the incidents described.
Sources & Further Reading
  1. Reason — original

Read the original at Reason

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